University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2013

Cooperation and Litigation Thoughts on the
American Experience
Richard L. Marcus
UC Hastings College of the Law, marcusr@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Marcus, Cooperation and Litigation Thoughts on the American Experience, 61 Kansas Law Review 821 (2013).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1120

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Cooperation and Litigation:
Thoughts on the American Experience
RichardMarcus
Contemporary German civil process is cooperative. It facilitates
reaching judgments quickly and cheaply based on substantive truth and
law. It is an explicit rejection of process that predated the Code of
Civil Procedure in 1877, which had been based, like American process
still is, on a kind of "battle-between-the-parties" model.
I grew up in the age of Rambo litigation.2 But from what I have read
since leaving practice for teaching more than thirty years ago, litigators
(and other American lawyers) may well be more adversarial and less

cooperative than ever. Some suggest that this tendency results in part
from client domination of lawyers.3 Far from serving as the learned
counselors that Dean Kronman applauded as representative of a lost
golden era of lawyering,4 today's litigator gets the case by winning a
"beauty contest" and remains thereafter under the client's thumb. No
longer does the lawyer tell the client what to do in the litigation; the
client-implementing a litigation budget-may control the day-to-day
details of what the lawyer does. And the client does not want to hire a
"cooperator," but rather a bulldog.
Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. I presented this paper at the Nov. 9, 2012, Kansas Law Review symposium "Advocacy Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure After 75 Years." In part, I drew on my experience since 1996
as Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. In the piece, however, I do not
speak for the Committee or for anyone else.
1.

JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYooHo LEE & ARMIN WEBER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL

JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 171 (2011).

2. "Rambo" lawyering is succinctly defined as "attorneys who employ whatever tactics
necessary for victory, no matter how repugnant." Joseph R. Wilbert, Note, Muzzling Rambo
Attorneys: Preventing Abusive Witness Coaching by Banning Attorney-Initiated Consultations with
Deponents, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129, 1129 (2008).

3. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1036-37 (1990) (noting
"private practitioners depend wholly on their clients for their livelihood, and this dependence is
fundamental in the distribution of power.").
4.

See generally ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION (1993) (bemoaning the rise of law firms that regard what they do solely as a business
focused on the bottom line, and the vanishing age of the lawyer as counselor and guide to the client).
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There must be much wrong with this picture, including its accuracy.
Even Republican candidates now emphasize their enthusiasm for
bipartisan cooperation to overcome voters' dislike for uncooperative
legislative posturing.' Surely lawyers are not really so adversarial as
portrayed by Hollywood.
American procedure has assumed that, in some ways, they are. But
that is not entirely a new thing. Indeed, one of the prime things Roscoe
Pound decried in his famous 1906 speech to the American Bar
Association (ABA) was the extreme adversarialism of American
litigation at that time.6 One of his goals was to equip judges to contain
and constrain that adversarialness. 7
The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, now approaching their seventy-fifth anniversary, were in
some ways an effort to move away from the pettifogging adversarial
behavior Pound found so lamentable. They sought to replace pleading
wars and games with simplified pleading, in some ways realizing the
mid-nineteenth century dream of David Dudley Field that pleading
niceties would not enable sneaky lawyers to torpedo valid claims.8 They
introduced broad discovery to enable parties to find out about the
evidence and avoid the sort of trial by ambush Pound described.9 And
they stressed flexibility, with Rule 1 emphasizing from the outset that the
rules should be construed to achieve justice.
Rambo tactics are not the only way to achieve justice, perhaps not
even a plausible way to do so. I intend to try to introduce the question of
cooperation in litigation in three pieces. First, I will try to reflect at a
very general level on why we might want litigators to be pretty
adversarial, and recoil somewhat at their trying instead to be cooperative.
Second, I will sketch very briefly and in great generality the sorts of
problems that seem to arise when laws command cooperative behavior,
5. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, Some Republicans Try Out a New
Campaign Theme: Bipartisanship,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2012, at A16 (describing campaign ads in
which Republican candidates eschewed "partisan obstreperousness" and instead sought to "promote
the wonders of bipartisanship").
6. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (1906) (denouncing "our American exaggerations of the
common law contentious procedure.").
7. Id. at 405 (suggesting that the legal system requires judges to be "mere umpires" and avoid
judicial interference-a notion that further provokes the contentiousness of adversarial proceedings).
8. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439-40 (1986).
9. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 733-39 (1998) (describing how revolutionary
the expansion of discovery in the 1938 Rules really was).
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which should make us cautious about moving too far toward legal
commands to cooperate. But these situations are distinguished by the
fact that judges ultimately do not have the authority to decide the things
on which the law aspires to encourage the parties to cooperate. Finally, I
will recognize that twenty-first century litigation-particularly involving
e-discovery-makes substantial and substantive cooperation essential
and effective. Against that background, it seems that the distinctive
thing about the topics on which judges now press for cooperation is that
they are matters on which the judge can enter an order resolving the
issue if the parties do not agree.
I.

EMBRACING RAMBO: THE LAWYER AS GUARDIAN

In ordinary life, cooperation is generally valued, and for good reason.
If everyone insisted on having everything his own way, ordinary life
would not be possible, or at least it would be pretty disagreeable. We
even have a term for people who insist on having their own way all the
time-"high maintenance." Cooperation and accommodation have been
essential to the development of complex societies; the lone cave-dweller
might not have needed to worry about what other people wanted, but the
modem city-dweller must. Most of the time, no dispute occurs even
when people do not get their first choice.
That general attitude of compromise (or at least tolerance) explains
something that academics emphasized a generation ago as the alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) movement began to attract followers-the low
frequency of formal litigation in comparison to the number of disputes
that arise in American society. A leading article presented a "dispute
pyramid" graphically demonstrating that only a tiny fraction of actual
disputes lead to litigation.10 These academic presentations were designed
to emphasize that-contrary to one theme often sounded in the 1970s
and 1980s-Americans are not singularly litigious.
Probably all would agree that it is a good thing Americans are not
actually as litigious as some assert they are. The point for our purposes
is that sometimes one might think it right for people not to be
cooperative, and recognize instead that they should stand and resist
10. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 525, 537 (1981); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscapeof Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1984), 11-18 (examining the attrition rate
among potential disputes before a third party-such as a lawyer-is called upon).
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accommodating the desires of others. Legal rights, after all, are often
designed to protect the less powerful. At a minimum, they may
counteract the insistence of some people on having their way. As one
scholar put it: "The claim that people have common interests can,
moreover, be a way of misleading the less powerful into collaborating
with more powerful in schemes that mainly benefit the latter.""
The basic point is that the argument can be made against
cooperation, particularly when legal rights are involved and litigation is
an option. Thus, Judge Edwards warned against unthinking embrace of
ADR during the 1980s:
One essential function of law is to reflect the public resolution of such
irreconcilable differences; lawmakers are forced to choose among these
differing visions of the public good. A potential danger of ADR is that
disputants who seek only understanding and reconciliation may treat as
irrelevant the choices made by our lawmakers and may, as a result,
ignore public values reflected in rules of law. 12
At some level, then, we want people to say "no." But we may be
concerned that they will find it difficult to do so. To take a recurrent
example, many have written about the risk that in marital breakups the
dominant partner-often the man-will take advantage of the other
spouse. 13 This is often where lawyers come in-they are, in a real sense,
spine-stiffeners. They can tell clients what their legal rights actually are.
They can encourage clients to stand up for their rights. They can go into
court and seek to vindicate those rights.
Besides these points, in a common law system, the result of private
litigation is a body of case law that guides others in their out-of-court
interactions. Thus, to some extent we want people to fight through to the
end sometimes so that we can get a judicial resolution of a dispute. 14
11.

JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARIAL DEMOCRACY 5 (1983).
12. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 679 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988) (arguing that the
introduction of social workers as mediating influences in child custody situations has produced a
"disaster" imposed on women due to social workers' preference for shared parenting). See generally
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991);
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
14. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L.
REv. 1, 19-20 (1987) (emphasizing that the absence of judicial decisions could increase disputes
because of unresolved issues about what the law requires).
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Indeed, the urge to cooperate may compromise those very legal
principles. Consider the attitude of a mediation enthusiast in relation to
divorce mediation:
Divorce mediation rejects the idea that legal rules should be used as
weapons to improve one party's position at the expense of the other.
Similarly, it rejects the idea that these legal rules and principles
embody any necessary wisdom or logic. In fact, it views them as being
arbitrary principles, having little to do with the realities of a couple's
life and not superior to the judgments that the couple could make on
their own.15
Surely there is a valid argument that lawyers may resist the notion that
their clients' legal protections are "arbitrary," and insist on pursuing their
clients' legal rights.
That is all heady stuff, the sort of speech lawyers who are enthusiasts
for law enforcement through private litigation intone whenever proposals
are made to curtail their freedom of action in litigation. But it is also a
critical starting point in assessing our commitment to cooperationrecognizing that cases in court represent failures of cooperation in which
one side or the other claims that legal rules require an outcome the other
side will not accept cooperatively. In a society in which much law
enforcement depends on private litigation, there is a public stake in that
litigation.
Should lawyers routinely engage in spine-stiffening, encouraging
their clients to take the most aggressive stance? Obviously not; at a
minimum that stance must be supported by law for a lawyer to endorse
it. 16 So the question is when lawyers should urge clients to compromise,
or at least to be collaborative, even though their legal rights support
combat.
Perhaps the strongest argument for resolute insistence on the full
measure of legal rights exists for the criminal defense lawyer. That
lawyer represents somebody-often truly "disempowered"-faced with
the full power of the State. For at least some,' 7 that lawyer is duty-bound
15. Lenard Marlow, The Rule ofLaw in Divorce Mediation, 9 MEDIATION Q. 5, 10 (1985).
16. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(2) (treating a lawyer's signature on a paper filed in court as
certifying that the contentions made "are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law").
17. Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this view is Dean Monroe Freedman. See, e.g.,
Monroe H. Freedman, In Praiseof Overzealous Representation-Lyingto Judges, Deceiving Third
Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 771, 775 (2006) (exploring the strong
version of zealous advocacy in the context of the criminal defendant).
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to consider only her client's interests and to advance them wherever not
forbidden to do so.
It may sometimes seem that, for criminal defense lawyers, refusal to
cooperate in regard to anything is the order of the day.'" If the
prosecution is having difficulty locating a witness and the speedy-trial
limits on when the case must be brought to trial will shortly expire, could
defense counsel justify "cooperating" with the prosecution to enable it to
find and present the witness? If the defendant is incompetent to stand
trial due to mental illness, should counsel encourage the client to take
medication that might overcome the illness? 9 It sometimes seems that
any trick in the book is fair game for the criminal defense lawyer, who
may appear to regard her main job as obstructing the prosecution. More
than forty years ago, Judge Henry Friendly asked plaintively, "Is
Innocence Irrelevant?" 20 Maybe it can be for the criminal defense
lawyer.
But at the same time, it does not seem that the cooperation
movement is nearly as broadly touted for criminal litigation as for civil
litigation. One reason might be the absence of something Dean Kronman
deplored about the "lost" lawyer 2 '-the much greater client dominance
achieved by some private clients, particularly large corporations. The
disempowered criminal defendant is not in a similar position to compel
his lawyer to do his bidding. Usually that lawyer will be hired by the
State, not the defendant. Sometimes, that lawyer can overtly undercut
his client's interests in court.22
Should lawyers in civil cases adopt a similar "take no prisoners"
attitude? At least in some sorts of cases, that seems counterproductive.
Family law again presents a good example. Should lawyers encourage
divorcing spouses to insist on the full measure of their legal rights and
18. See Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 209, 210-11 (2006) (discussing how the criminal defense lawyer's
paramount obligation obstructs the search for truth in a case).
19. Cf Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003) (holding that a court may order
administration of antipsychotic medication to render the defendant competent to stand trial only
under limited circumstances).
20. See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
21. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 284-85 (finding that the increase in specialized big firms
decreases lawyer bargaining power).
22. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (holding the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel was not violated when defense counsel threatened to withdraw and
impeach client's testimony during the murder trial if client insisted on taking stand and committing
pejury).
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fight to the bitter end? That bitterness itself might poison the lives of the
couple's children, which explains why many states require mediation
whenever child custody is at issue in divorce cases.23 Indeed, familiar
lore has it that lawyers do not often have to encourage their clients to
take aggressive stances in divorce cases; to the contrary, they may more
often be the ones urging moderation to avoid an outcome like the one in
the movie The War of the Roses.2 4
Perhaps it is time for a similar attitude to prevail in all civil litigation.
About forty years ago, the federal judiciary took up Dean Pound's cudgel
and rejected the extreme adversarial attitude.25 One sparkplug was a
speech by then-Judge Frankel, urging that the search for truth be elevated
to primacy among counsel's obligations.26 More generally, federal
judges have embraced the case-management movement and striven to
regulate lawyer behavior in civil litigation. 27 This attitude has largely
depended on cooperative behavior by the lawyers before them; in the
absence of such cooperation, judges may find that they cannot easily
design specific directives for given cases.28
So we are left with two competing concerns. On the one hand, the
desire of litigants for justice-a decision according to governing legal
principles-is a justified urge; on the other hand, we must have a
realistic appreciation that compromise is a generally desirable thing.
Lawyers are likely to find that they are regularly tugged in two directions
by these ideals. Judges must similarly keep both in mind.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF MANDATED COOPERATION

Appreciating the competing tensions underlying the cooperation
debate, one can consider whether cooperation itself should-or couldbecome a mandate. In this section, I hope to present a very brief sketch
of several areas of law in which the effort to enforce cooperation has
23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (2000 & Supp. 2012); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170
(West 2004 & Supp. 2013).
24. A divorcing and cohabitating couple engages in constant quarrel that ultimately results in
the death of both parties. THE WAR OF THE ROSES (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1989).
25. See generally, Roscoe Pound, Improving the Administration ofJustice, 29 A.B.A. J. 494,
494 (1943) ("[T]hese are limitations upon law in the sense of the judicial and the administrative
processes.").

26. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search For Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031,
1038 (1975).
27. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the American Litigator: The New Role of
American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 3 (2003).
28. Id. at 15.
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proven difficult for judges. Each of these areas of law must be explored
at much greater length to do it any justice, and this presentation will
oversimplify and probably distort each of them. But the goal is only to
show that the judiciary has experience with the difficulty of enforcing
commands to cooperate, and generally shuns them.
A. The Duty ofLabor and Management to Bargain in "Good Faith"
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act obligates unions
and employers to bargain "in good faith." 2 9 By so commanding, it was
designed to some extent to change the conditions of "industrial warfare"
that had prevailed before its adoption. In most instances, that shift would
likely have strengthened unions, but it was not designed to require the
parties to reach any particular agreement. 30 An early focus was on
mandatory topics of negotiation; neither side could absolutely refuse at
least to discuss those topics.3 ' Unions with sufficient power to insist
would put additional issues on the table; those who could not would try
to persuade the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to insist that
"good faith bargaining" include consideration of those issues.32
Resolving these disputes became a taxing effort a half century ago.
The dramatic decline in the power of private sector unions since then
gives a somewhat sepia-toned aspect to these disputes, but they still stand
as a warning about the utility of governmental regulation of negotiation.
Initially, the idea was that the content and outcome of collective
bargaining was beyond the authority of government. As the Chairman of
the pertinent Senate Committee declared:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort
them to the door of their employer and say, "Here they are, the legal
representatives of your employees." What happens behind those doors
is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.3 3

29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006).
30. Archibald Cox & John T. Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National
Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389, 389-90 (1950).
31.
Id. at 393-94.
32. Id at 391.
33. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484 (1960) (referencing the statement of
Senator Walsh).
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But particularly with weaker unions, there was surely a temptation to
peek inside the door. After all, one goal of the legislation was to foster
labor peace by encouraging collective bargaining agreements.3 4
The Supreme Court recognized that "Congress intended that the
parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by
any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of their
differences." 35 But it also recognized that "there is tension between the
principle that the parties need not contract on any specific terms and a
practical enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal with
each other in a serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a
common ground." 3 6 One resolution was at least to require flexibility on
the various mandatory topics: "A refusal to negotiate in fact as to any
subject which is within § 8(d) . .. violates § 8(a)(5) though the employer
has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon an over-all
collective agreement."37
This set of imperatives presented the NLRB, and also the courts,
with a challenging job. How exactly does one assess the "good faith" of
the bargaining independent of assessing the propriety of the positions
taken by the bargainer? Under the leadership of Lemuel Boulware,
General Electric adopted a strategy of relatively overt refusal to comply
with the Act. Boulware concluded that the routine negotiating tactics of
beginning with an unfavorable proposal that could gradually be
improved as negotiations evolved was wasteful and produced imperfect
ultimate agreements.38 In its place, he concluded that General Electric
should make a "fair and firm offer" initially, after much study, and then
take the position that it would not change that offer unless the union
demonstrated that the offer was based on some sort of mistake of fact. 3 9
The union claimed that this violated the duty to negotiate, and the Board
so concluded.4 0 It said that GE's "'bargaining' position is akin to that of
a party who enters into negotiations 'with a predetermined resolve not to

34. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964) (quoting Int'l Harvester Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962).
35. Ins. Agents'Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 488.
36. Id. at 486.
37. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
38. See Gen. Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 208 (1964) (discussing G.E.'s policy of bargaining
where it voluntarily offers what is "'right' for employees").
39. Id.
40. Id. at 194.
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budge from an initial position,' an attitude inconsistent with good faith

bargaining."41
Even with such overtly unilateral action, commentators found that
the problem was that the Board could not identify any specific action
taken by GE that violated the Act. As a consequence:
[T]he GE decision imparts only an exhortation to the GE management
to change its frame of mind without necessarily changing any of its
actions. How equitable or effective is a decree that offers neither the
by which to judge the
company nor the union any guide whatever
legality of management's future actions? 42
At least here, the basic problem seems to be the one we started
with-the fact that the Board and the courts are not in a position to do
more than insist on "good faith bargaining." They cannot impose a
solution. But the Act also rather clearly sought to press the parties to
resolve their differences at the negotiating table, and probably also
sought in general to strengthen unions in their dealings with
management.43 This led to a "totality of the circumstances" approach to
evaluating the parties' (particularly the employer's) conduct, and
sometimes could lead the NLRB to denounce attitudes or tactics adopted
by parties that seemed unreceptive to reaching a collaborative
That impulse probably contributed to the NLRB's
agreement.44
reputation as a biased union supporter that overstepped its statutory role,
thereby engendering the enduring enmity of the business community. 4 5
That surely is not a direction courts would want to go.
B. The Relation Between an Insurer and Insured
In California, every driver is legally required to have liability
insurance, and much the same is true in many other states.46 To get that
41. Id. at 195-96.
42. James A. Gross, Donald E. Cullen & Kurt L. Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor
Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1031 (1968).
43. Id.
44. Id.at lO-ll.
45.

See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 211-13 (2010) (explaining that the business

community vehemently opposed giving the EEOC enforcement authority of anti-discrimination
provisions in Title VII because it feared the EEOC would behave in that sphere as the NLRB had in
the labor sphere).
46. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies: Driving,
Insurance, Torts, and Changing the "Choice Architecture" ofAuto Insurance Pricing,44 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 69, 74 (2010) (explaining that most states require drivers to purchase liability insurance).
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insurance, drivers must contract with a limited set of insurers, and the
relationship is (like the labor-management relationship) closely
regulated.47 In particular, the conduct of the insurer and the insured
when litigation occurs or is threatened gives rise to some distinctive
responsibilities. The insurer's responsibilities have generated a whole
new species of law-the bad faith refusal to settle a claim.48
It can be said that the insurer has a "quasi-fiduciary relationship"
with the insured. 4 9 As the Colorado Supreme Court has explained:
"[T]he duty of good faith derives from the relationship of an insured
claimant to the provider of benefits. This relationship, arising from the
underlying insurance or compensation obligation. . . permeates all the
dealings between the parties." 50 This attitude has even been applied
when the insured makes a claim against the insurer under coverage for
injuries received from an uninsured motorist, which might seem to place
the insured and the insurer in an entirely adverse relationship."
More often, the tension between the insurer and the insured has to do
with the "duty to settle" claims brought against the insured for conduct
potentially covered by the insurance. There is a potentially adversarial
relationship when there is a substantial question about whether the
insured is really liable at all and there is also a significant potential that
the insured will, if found liable, be held liable for more than the policy
limits. In those circumstances, an entirely self-interested insurer might
think it worthwhile to resist the claim on the merits, hoping to avoid any
liability to indemnify, while the insured might want the insurer to offer
the policy limits to settle the whole case, protecting the insured against
liability above those limits. That tension is the source of the tort claim
for bad faith failure to settle. If the insurer does not settle, and judgment
is entered against the insured for more than the policy limits, the insured
may have a claim against the insurer. And the plaintiff may be willing to
settle with the insured (who thereby protects his other assets) for an
assignment of the claim against the insurer. If that claim is successful, it
is not subject to the policy limit because, if the insurer had willingly paid
47. See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident
Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities,47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 361 (2004) (discussing the range of
regulation governing automobile insurance and liability).
48. See, e.g., Fortner v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 686 S.E.2d 93, 94 (Ga. 2009).
49. Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Colo. 1984).
50. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1268 (Colo. 1985).
51. But see Seabron v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 862 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Colo. 2012)
(holding that even in this situation the insurer and the insured are not in a "purely adversarial"
relationship, and the insurer has a continuing duty to deal in good faith with the insured).
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the policy limit, it could have kept its liability to that limit and also
protected the insured.
Charting this set of obligations owed by the insurer to the insured is
risky and difficult, as the Ninth Circuit recently found out in a case
fitting the model described above. The insured there was involved in a
collision in which three people in the other car claimed injury.5 2 The
insurer did not take the initiative by making a settlement offer to the
lawyer for those three people.s3 For some time they made no demand on
the insurer. 5 4 Eventually their lawyer demanded the policy limits$300,000 for a single accident-but the insurer did not agree.55 Then the
most seriously injured plaintiff sued, and eventually won a judgment for
more than $4 million.56 After that, the insured assigned the bad faith
claim to the plaintiff, who sued the insurer.57 At the trial of that case, the
district judge rejected plaintiffs proposed jury instruction that suggested
the insurer should have taken the initiative by offering to settle the case
rather than awaiting a settlement demand from plaintiff, and the insurer
prevailed. On plaintiffs appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel addressed the
question "whether the duty more broadly requires an insurer to effectuate
settlement when liability is reasonably clear, even in the absence of a
settlement demand. For several reasons, we conclude that it does."5 ' But
for other reasons, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the
insurer.59
It seems that the California courts had never clearly resolved the
question whether the insurer had to take the initiative, and the Ninth
Circuit's dictum, quoted above, provoked an uproar and a petition for
rehearing even though the insurer ultimately won. 6 0 Eventually, the
Ninth Circuit withdrew its original opinion and affirmed in a chaste
opinion that avoided addressing the issue.6 1

52. Yan Fang Du v. Allstate Ins. Co., 681 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir.), amended and
superseded by 697 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2012).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1121.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1123.
59. Id. at 1127.
60. See Ben Adlin, 9th Circuit's Insurance Case Reversal Leaves Lawyers Dizzy, S.F. DAILY
J., Oct. 24, 2012, at 1 (describing controversy resulting from Ninth Circuit's initial opinion).
61.
Yan Fang Du v. Allstate Ins. Co., 697 F.3d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 2012).
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This episode highlights both the distinctiveness and the sensitivity of
the law regarding duties of insurers in essence to "cooperate" to avoid
exposing their customers to large claims. As one of the uninitiated, I
certainly do not propose to venture onto the sort of legal thin ice that this
Ninth Circuit panel encountered in attempting to clarify this body of law.
Instead, I want only to emphasize that these difficult issues result from
the singularity of the problem-a duty that almost requires the insurer to
"bid against itself."
But there are additional singular, and sometimes controversial,
cooperation aspects to the relationship between the insurer and the
insured. Because it may have to pay (up to the policy limits) for the
insured's torts, the insurer is protected by an obligation owed by the
insured to cooperate in the defense of a case brought by somebody
claiming to be the victim of actions covered by the policy.6 2 If the
insured does not cooperate, the insurer is off the hook.
Some regard
this duty of the insured to be comparable to the duty of the insurer to
defend," and it has been implied in insurance policies in which it is not
affirmatively stated. 65 As a general rule, this obligation to cooperate
extends to assisting the insurer in investigation and settlement of the
claim and in the defense of the claim if the insurer is providing it. 6 But
the failure of the insured to satisfy the obligation does not always relieve
the insurer of its duty to defend or indemnify.
As the Ninth Circuit discovered, charting these waters is hazardous.
For our purposes, it suffices to recognize that dealing with cooperation in
this specialized area is an ongoing challenge for the courts. Prescribing
cooperating more broadly would undoubtedly magnify the challenge.

62. Monique M. Fuentes & William D. Burger, The PracticalImpact ofan Insurance Policy's
"Cooperation Clause" on an Insured and Its Insurance Carrier, DRI TODAY, Oct. 14, 2011,
http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=179.
63. See id. (stating that most courts will approve an insurer's denial of coverage following
breach of the Cooperation Clause if insurer can show prejudice, and some courts approve denial
without a show of prejudice).
64. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25
SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 122 (1994) (arguing that the insured has a duty to cooperate with regard to
an insurance claim that is as stringent as the insurer's duty to defend). But see Kransco v. Am.
Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 15-16 (Cal. 2000) (holding that the insured is not subject to
a comparative fault for failure to cooperate in suit for bad faith conduct by the insurer).
65. 14 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 199:3 (3d ed. 1995).
66.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 39 (Am. Law Inst., Preliminary

Draft No. 5, Aug. 24, 2012).
67. See id. at 40.
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C. ContractualDuties To Negotiate
The insurance situation at least involves parties that have entered
into a contract; it is understandable that they may have some duties to
each other. But how about parties that have not reached such an
agreement? Gradually, the notion that liability could be posited on
conduct during negotiations that actually never led to a formal and final
contract gave rise to the possibility of a general obligation to negotiate in
good faith-something like cooperation. A prominent example (often
displayed in casebooks) is Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,68 in which
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a prospective franchisee could
recover from a franchisor, even though their negotiation of a franchise
agreement ultimately fell through, because it had led him into various
moves that caused him losses.6 9 In essence, the court adopted a
promissory estoppel theory. In 1969, Professor Knapp wrote a seminal
article on the subject.70
This has not served as a fount for a more general duty to cooperate or
deal in good faith. For example, a generation ago Dean Perschbacher
forecast that those special features bore on an expansion he expected of
lawyers' possible duties to nonclients:
One such change is an expansion of the duty to bargain in good faith.
Currently this obligation is restricted to labor negotiations and
insurance, both highly regulated because of perceived special public
interests. Most of the elements that comprise good faith bargaining in
labor and insurance negotiations are either common to all negotiations,
such as the proscription against misrepresentation, or are uniquely
dependent on the substantive context, such as mandatory bargaining
topics in labor law. Thus labeling them part of good faith bargaining
does not carry any im lications for a general fairness good faith
principle in negotiations.
More generally, Professor Farnsworth reported in 1987 that
American courts have been very cautious about finding that parties have
duties to negotiate agreements in good faith in the absence of some
special fiduciary obligation. Although there are a few examples in which
courts have imposed liability for what seemed almost deceptive
68.
69.
70.
71.
(1985).

133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
Id. at 275.
See Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673 (1969).
Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 75, 134-35
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negotiation tactics that induced costly reliance by the other party to the
negotiations, in general they have been felt to be free to break off their
negotiations at any time and for any reason. As Professor Farnsworth
explains:
Some scholarly writers ... argue that a general obligation of fair
dealing may arise out of the negotiations themselves, at least if the
disappointed party has been led to believe that success is in prospect.
Thus Summers wrote that if courts follow Red Owl, "it will no longer
be possible for one party to scuttle contract negotiations with impunity
when the other has been induced to rely to his detriment on the prospect
that the negations will succeed." American courts, however, have been
unreceptive to these arguments and have declined to find a general
obligation that would preclude a party from breaking off negotiations,
even when the success was in prospect. 72
Thus, although there are cases that recognize and enforce a
contractual agreement to bargain in good faith, others remain skeptical
about the notion. 74 Even when they entertain the notion that such a
contract may be enforceable, courts may often conclude that there has
been no proof that the party who refused to go. forward acted in bad
faith.7 ' Further, when presented with "agreements to agree," most courts
have balked at finding in such a nebulous contractual undertaking an
obligation enforceable in court. This caution may be a signal about the
utility of cooperation in the litigation setting.

72.
E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and PreliminaryAgreements: FairDealing
and FailedNegotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 239 (1987) (quoting Robert S. Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA.
L. REv. 195, 225 (1968)); see also Knapp, supra note 70, at 673.
73. See, e.g., Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2005); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins
U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
74. See, e.g., Ohio Calculating, Inc. v. CPT Corp., 846 F.2d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
written agreement calling for "good faith negotiations" was "unenforceable and unremediable
agreement to negotiate"); Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Cal. Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the commencement of negotiations in and of itself does
not create a duty to bargain in good faith).
75. See, e.g., Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding defendant free to negotiate for new terms not covered in letter of intent so long as it "was
not trying to scuttle the deal"); IDT Corp. v. Tyco Grp., 918 N.E.2d 913, 917 (N.Y. 2009) (the
parties negotiated about open terms for almost three years, and there was no evidence either party
failed to act in good faith).
76. Farnsworth, supra note 72, at 263-64.
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D. The Duty to Mediate in Litigation
Parties might by their negotiations have induced detrimental reliance
that would justify compensation, but it would seem that litigants who
already have a dispute pending in court are in a different situation. Yet
increasingly courts are expecting and sometimes demanding that parties
before them negotiate about settlement. Can they insist that the parties
be reasonable and cooperative in those negotiations? Can insisting on
one's day in court be regarded as unreasonable and uncooperative,
leading to adverse action by the judge?
In at least one context, cooperation can, in a sense, be compelled.
Proposed class-action settlements can be approved by the court over the
objections of class members. The court may do so only if satisfied that
the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate."n Dissenting class
members have a right to object,78 and they may appeal if the settlement is
nonetheless approved. 79 But even very substantial opposition within the
class does not doom the settlement.80 As the Second Circuit put it:
[M]ajority opposition to a settlement cannot serve as an automatic bar
to a settlement that a district judge, after weighing all the strengths and
weaknesses of a case and the risks of litigation, determines to be
manifestly reasonable. Preventing settlement in such circumstances not
only deprives other class members of the benefits of a manifestly fair
settlement and subjects them to the uncertainties of litigation, but, in
this case, would most likely have resulted in the eventual
disappointment of the objecting class members as well.81
Class actions are, however, a striking exception to the general rule
that the client controls the decision of whether to settle; judicial
paternalism is not usually the order of the day. But that principle often
gives way-to the lawyers' and the parties' advantage-to the reality
that settlements can offer desirable outcomes superior to the uncertainties
and risks of litigation. 82 Courts-under prompting by Congress-

77. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2).
78. Id. 23(e)(5).
79. Devlin v. Scardaletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002).
80. See, e.g., Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331, 1334 (5th Cir. 1977) (approving
settlement despite objections of almost fifty percent of the class).
81. TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. See generally Samuel Issacharoff& Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1202 (2009) ("[A]II citizens are better off for the prospect of a secure, if
imperfect, system of compensation and deterrence. Trials are ... a small part of that balance.").
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increasingly press parties to discuss settlement early and seriously. 83
That is desirable.84
But the sticking point is whether courts can insist that parties bring a
cooperative attitude to these sessions, and how exacting they can become
about the cooperativeness of that attitude. On one level, the rules
explicitly permit the court to require that parties be present or available
"to consider possible settlement."85 But requiring that the parties settle
seems to push beyond that frontier. If courts can insist that parties send
somebody with authority to discuss settlement, can they also insist on
settlement on terms the judge deems satisfactory, and can the judge
impose sanctions for refusal to accept terms that judge deems
satisfactory?
Giving certain answers to these questions is difficult or impossible,
but that difficulty suggests the perils of insisting too energetically on
cooperation to settle lawsuits. Consider a medical malpractice case in
which a nonbinding summary jury trial led to an award of $200,000, and
plaintiff then agreed to settle for $175,000, but the attorney for the
defendant doctor's insurer was not authorized to go above $125,000.86
The judge then ordered defense counsel to come to a settlement
conference with "someone who can enter into a settlement in this range
without having to call anyone else."87 But the adjuster who attended the
settlement conference told the judge that her instructions from the home
office were to repeat the prior offer "and not to bother to call them back
if it were not accepted."8
The judge found that the insurer had
deliberately refused to obey a court order, entered defendant's default,
and set an Order to Show Cause hearing regarding criminal contempt by
the insurer.89 Though this case does not go so far as to insist that parties
behave as judges deem cooperative, 90 some may regard it as coming
close.
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (allowing courts to order pretrial conferences for the purpose
of facilitating settlement).
84. See generally Issacharoff & Klonoff, supra note 82, at 1195-98 (arguing that most
claimants are more interested in compensation via settlement than formal legal vindication in court,
and that the compensation they receive serves a societal interest in deterring wrongful behavior).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
86. Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Consider the analysis in Edward Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute
Resolution: What Form of ParticipationShould Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2107-08
(1993), regarding the malpractice case described in text:
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Should judges insist on settlement on their terms, or at least on terms
they deem "fair, reasonable, and adequate," 9' as in class actions? As the
Second Circuit has said, "Although the law favors the voluntary
settlement of civil suits, it does not sanction efforts by trial judges to
effect settlements through coercion . . ..

In short, pressure tactics to

coerce settlement simply are not permissible." 92
In terms of cooperation, perhaps the most difficult question arises
with the litigant that insists it will not settle. Consider the reaction of a
judge to such a position from Wal-Mart:
Because Wal-Mart's asserted "no settlement" litigation policy will
require the Court to expend substantial judicial time and resources in a
trial which might have been avoided if Wal-Mart had been willing to
engage in meaningful settlement negotiations, the Court finds that it
would be just to require the attendance at trial of Wal-Mart's general
counsel or some other Wal-Mart corporate officer with litigation policy
authority.
The Court recognizes that a party has the right to refuse to offer any
money for settlement in a given case and the court cannot require a
party to make a monetary settlement offer in any given case. (Indeed,
one might find it refreshing for a party to take a "principled stand"
against settlement in a given case.) However, in the Court's view, an
across-the-board policy of refusing to negotiate frustrates both the letter
and spirit of both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's
Lockhart is an appropriate fact situation for sanctions. Defendant's refusal to send
a representative with any settlement authority at all, other than to reiterate the previous
offer, insured that the conference would be a futile proceeding. Requiring settlement
authority does not coerce a party into settling for any specific amount, and litigant
autonomy cannot justify ignoring a requirement directed at avoiding wasteful negotiation
tactics.
The hard cases arise when the representative's settlement authority is more
ambiguous than in Lockhart. Assume that an insurance company sends a representative
with authority to settle only up to $10,000, on the basis that it has thoroughly reviewed
the case and is convinced that there is no liability at all and, that, in any event, the
reasonable damages are much smaller than that amount. Surely the company should not
be required to give its representative authority to settle at a higher amount when it has
concluded that there is no justification for doing so. But the key inquiry is what the
representative's instructions are. If he is sent without authority to consider any settlement
above $ 10,000, this is essentially a "no authority" case as in Lockhart. A court should be
entitled to require that the representative at least be open to hearing the arguments of the
other side with the possibility of settling at any amount found to be persuasive, even
though the representative understands that the company has evaluated the case as not
worth more than $10,000. If his authority and instructions are so limited that he is deaf to
any persuasion, then he is not the proper representative with adequate authority that the
court has ordered.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1).
92. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Local Rules, which encourage good faith settlement efforts in order to
preserve scarce judicial resources. Here, the Court is, in fact, not even
requiring Wal-Mart to engage in settlement negotiations. It is simply
requiring Wal-Mart's General Counsel, or other responsible corporate
officer, to be present for trial, as the Court believes that requiring the
attendance of such a Wal-Mart official during trial could have a
salutary effect in that the responsible officer would have an opportunity
to observe first-hand the effect of the company's policy both on the
Court in general and in a particular case. Certainly, if this policy is
important enough for Wal-Mart to persist in, then it is not asking
too
much for a responsible corporate officer to be present for trial. 93
One could regard this education session for the Wal-Mart official as
verging on coercion, but it is not a legal command to be reasonable or
cooperative in relation to settlement of this case. As Professor Molot has
argued, judges promoting settlement are moving furthest from their
judicial role.94 The deeper the judge gets into the merits of the settlement
in a command role (as opposed to an advisory role), the greater the
difficulty of identifying legal grounds for her positions.
E. Summary
This discussion should illustrate that the judicial experience with
enforcing a duty to cooperate has not been entirely satisfactory. There
seems inevitably to be considerable difficulty deternining when those
whose interests stand in tension cross a line by taking unreasonable
positions instead of cooperating with their adversaries. A part of the
court-annexed ADR repertoire is the appreciation that negotiation alone
is not sufficient to resolve disputes. One can push hard for settlement,
but not too hard; parties do have a right to come to court for a decision.
But there surely are myriad topics on which parties might cooperate
in the conduct of litigation even if they cannot agree on the ultimate
resolution. Are those different? Consider the thoughts of a recently
appointed Magistrate Judge in the Northern District of California:
[L]awyers do advocate for their clients-fight about deadlines and
where the deposition should take place. Things like that, that I think to
people who have not been involved in civil litigation before can seem
petty. But I know from having done civil litigation, sometimes those
93. Shedden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 484, 486 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
94. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 43
(2003) ("The most controversial of all judicial management tools-the judicial settlement
conference-is the one that strays furthest from the judiciary's traditional adjudicative role.").
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seemingly small fights end up being an essential part of the eventual
outcome of the case. So I understand. 95
Contrast those thoughts with the views of another recently appointed
Magistrate Judge in the same court, who wished that "experienced
attorneys would be a bit more proactive based on their experience in
resolving disputes":
I would think a more experienced attorney would work a little bit
harder to try to resolve the dispute. And sometimes they do, but then
maybe they're dealing with someone else who just won't work with
them and there's nothing that they can do, at that point, except seek
court intervention.

Now and then, you'll see a more experienced

attorney and I'll think, "I know you've done lots of these and you know
how it's likely to turn out, so, you can bring some more realistic
perspective to the table when you meet and confer." I would like to see

them work a little bit harder towards resolving their own disputes. 96

The problem, then, is to determine how the courts should approach
these kinds of issues. There is likely no legal rule that precisely resolves
such disputes. Should the lawyers be commanded to cooperate in
resolving them? Would the judge be doing his job if he announced that
on such matters, in the absence of an agreement, he would simply pick
the position he regarded as most reasonable, and not split the baby? That
might be a practical lever to prompt cooperation-fear the judge would
opt for the other side's proposal as slightly more reasonable.
At least it seems we have reached the heartland of appropriate
judicial insistence on lawyer cooperation. Here, the backstop of that
insistence is that the judge ultimately has clear authority, indeed
responsibility, to decide. We might say the hypothetical judge was
shirking a duty to decide under the law by instead picking the less
unreasonable position in the discovery dispute, but that seems to insist on
too much law about what arrangements should be employed in discovery
in a given case. Seeking cooperation is a valuable adjunct to the
authority to decide, but for our purposes the key point is that the
authority exists. Particularly in relation to matters on which an agreed
protocol is superior to one imposed by judicial fiat, the judge should
have authority to insist on cooperation. In that way, the key issues about
95.
Technology Is Great, But Have a Backup Plan (interview with Hon. Nathanael Cousins),
S.F. RECORDER, May 7, 2012, at 8.
96. Don't Throw In the Towel on Discovery (interview with Hon. Kandis Westmore), S.F.
Recorder, Nov. 6, 2012, at I1.
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procedural cooperation are qualitatively different from the ones surveyed
in this section.
III. AMERICAN PROCEDURAL COOPERATION COMMANDS
The German procedure code "imposes on parties a duty of
cooperation in clarifying the issues in the case." 97 Section 1 of the
Korean Civil Practice Act "imposes on the parties a duty to cooperate in
good faith."9 8 There has been at least some discussion of adding a
comparable cooperation plank to Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but misgivings have also been expressed that this sort of
provision would be more likely to invite conflict than to prompt actual
cooperation.
Rules commanding cooperation have appeared, however, in a
number of places. In San Francisco, for example, the Northern District
of California recently adopted Guidelines for the Discovery of
Electronically Stored Information.9 9 The second General Guideline is
entitled "Cooperation":
The Court expects cooperation on issues relating to the preservation,
collection, search, review, and production of ESI. The Court notes that
an attorney's zealous representation of a client is not compromised by
conducting discovery in a cooperative manner. Cooperation in
reasonably limiting ESI discovery requests on the one hand, and in
reasonably responding to ESI discovery requests on the other hand,
tends to reduce litigation costs and delay. The Court emphasizes the
particular importance of cooperative exchanges of information at the
earliest possible stage of discovery, including during the parties' Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference. 00
The local rules of the District of Maryland similarly invoke the goals of
Rule 1-just, speedy, and inexpensive conduct of discovery-and add:
"The parties and counsel have an obligation to cooperate in planning and
conducting discovery to tailor the discovery to ensure that it meets these
objectives."'' The local rules of the Southern and Eastern Districts of
97. MAXEINER, supra note 1, at 177.
98. Id. at 198.
99. Court Adopts New E-Discovery Guidelines Effective November 27, 2012, U. S. DISTRICT
CT. N. DISTRICT OF CAL., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/news/101 (last visited Feb. 6,2013).
100.

GUIDELINES FOR THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION

§

1.02

(N.D. Cal. 2012).
101. D. MD. R. app. A. See also Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354,
357-58 (D. Md. 2008) (explaining the duty to cooperate).
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New York say much the same thing.' 02 The Sedona Cooperation
Proclamation emphasizes the same sort of impulse.' 03 Something like
100 judges have signed on.' 04 Surely many other examples exist.
Without a cooperation provision in Rule 1, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure nonetheless urge or require behavior that could be called
cooperative in a number of places:
(1)Rule 26(f) directs the parties to confer early in the case, and
contains several provisions that direct cooperation, at least as
compared to the "trial by ambush" ethos of Roscoe Pound's day.
(2)The parties must "consider the nature and basis of their claims and
defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the
case. 105
(3)The parties must "discuss any issues about preserving discoverable
information."l 06
(4) The parties must "attempt[] in good faith to agree on [a] proposed
discovery plan."' 0 7
(5)The discovery plan must include a wide variety of details, including
the subjects on which discovery is needed, any issues about ediscovery, and any issues about preserving privilege. 08
(6)Rule 16(f)(1)(B) authorizes sanctions against a party or attorney
who "does not participate in good faith" in a pretrial conference.1 09
(7)Rule 37(a)(1) requires that a motion to compel discovery be
supported by a certification "that the movant has in good faith
102. See S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. R. 26.4. Local Rule 26.4 provides:
(a) Counsel are expected to cooperate with each other, consistent with the interests of
their clients, in all phases of the discovery process and to be courteous in their dealings
with each other, including in matters relating the scheduling and timing of various
discovery procedures.
(b) Discovery requests shall be read reasonably in the recognition that the attorney
serving them generally does not have the information being sought and the attorney
receiving them generally does have such information or can obtain it from the client.
103.

See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERATION PROCLAMATION (2008), available at

https://thesedonaconference.org/cooperation-proclamation.
104. Id.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. 26(f)(3).
109. Id. 16(f)(1)(B).
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conferred or attempted to confer. . . in
110an effort to obtain [the
desired discovery] without court action."
(8)Rule 16(a) authorizes the court to order pretrial conferences for
various purposes including "discourging wasteful pretrial
activities" and "encouraging settlement."
(9) Rule 16(c)(1) commands each party to "authorize at least one of its
attorneys to make stipulations and admissions about all matters that
can reasonably be anticipated for discussion at a pretrial
conference.", 12 Rule 16(c)(2) lists fifteen categories of topics
suitable for discussion at such a conference, and then adds that such
a conference may also consider "facilitating in other ways the just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action."11 3
(10)Rule 11 (b)(1) makes an attorney's signature on a filing in court a
certification that the positions he takes are "not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
11 4 unnecessary delay,
or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.,
Taken together, these provisions might appear to empower an
American judge to insist on something approaching what the German or
Korean judge expects in the way of cooperation. But when she insists on
cooperation on these topics, the judge is not entering into the sorts of
difficulties presented by the examples in Part II. How often is the place
or time of a deposition a matter of real moment? How often might
posturing about such things reflect a strategy to achieve litigation
advantage? Perhaps it is true, as the magistrate judge quoted above
suggests, that knock-down, drag-out fights about such topics actually
achieve such importance that they end up driving settlement or other
resolution.1 15
But should courts be patient with such posturing? Frankly, it is
likely that the posturing will vanish or at least recede in the presence of
the judge. Indeed, the difference in demeanor of counsel when the judge
is there to watch is sometimes very striking. One possible solution to
that problem is for judges to be more available to address mundane
discovery matters like time and place of a deposition. It is certainly said
110. Id. 37(a)(1). A similar requirement appears in Rule 37(d)(1)(B) even though that provision
applies only in situations in which the other side has completely failed to respond to the discovery.
112. Id. 16(a).
112. Id. 16(c)(1).
113. Id. 16(c)(2).

114.
115.

Id. II1(b)(1).
See supra text accompanying note 95 (quoting recently appointed Magistrate Judge).
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that judges who do make themselves available actually have to resolve
very few discovery disputes. Somehow cooperation occurs before the
matter must be presented to the judge. Indeed, many lawyers call this
sort of judicial behavior "adult supervision."
Why can't lawyers behave like adults when the judge is not there?
Most can and do. Perhaps that behavior is more prominent in litigation
in which the lawyers deal with one another regularly than litigation
involving lawyers who have no track record with one another. That
might explain why, despite the tendency mentioned above of criminal
defense counsel to exploit everything they can use to frustrate the
prosecution, judges often report that the lawyers in their criminal cases
are much more cooperative than litigators in civil cases.
Perhaps that behavior also reflects client preferences or imperatives
in criminal litigation more frequently than in civil litigation. For a
variety of reasons, clients in civil cases may want to game the system as
long as possible. For a variety of reasons, they may regard devious
activity as the service lawyers provide, and expect to get their own
share.1 16 For a variety of reasons, parties do not readily take account of
the weaknesses in their cases, or the strengths in the other side's case;
that is one of the reasons for judges to insist that the clients show up for
settlement conferences. Perhaps clients who are prone to fighting over
everything and other forms of misbehavior look for and find lawyers for
whom that is the modus operandi; at some point it is permissible to
punish the client for what the lawyer did because the client selected the
lawyer.1 17
No doubt zealous representation would be at least an excuse for
obstructive or disruptive lawyer behavior in situations in which the real
reason is less savory. At a minimum, judges can expect that lawyers will
not succumb to the temptation to use impolite or overbearing tactics.
They can try to inspire cooperation as well, without lowering the boom
as authorized by the many rules listed above. Probably the way judges
can further this goal is diligent case management. More than thirty years
ago, Judge Peckham, one of the pioneers in the case management
movement, stressed that holding an early case management conference
(not then required by the Rules) "warns the attorneys that they have a
116. Consider, for example, the Jim Carey movie Liar Liar, about the lawyer who suddenly is
prevented from telling a lie and finds he can't do his job. LIAR LIAR (Universal Pictures 1997).
117. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) ("Petitioner voluntarily
chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of
the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.").
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vigilant judge," and alerts the judge to whether the case involves "a
particularly combative attorney who, if the case is not actively managed
during pretrial, might succeed in turning a trial that should be a molehill
into a mountain."' 18 This technique is much more widespread now, and
it still should work.
One analogy that comes to mind is the labor law notion of mandatory
topics of negotiation. 1 9 When a judge tells the parties to negotiate a
regime for electronic discovery, in effect the judge is doing what the
Rules expect. The Rules themselves cannot prescribe the details of a
discovery regime for an individual case, and a judge is also ill-equipped
to do so. There are, in short, some things that judges should be able to
insist that lawyers do to make the litigation system work. They should
not have to insist; indeed, the Rules often already direct the lawyers to do
these things. Rule 26(f) instructs the lawyers to discuss e-discovery and
preservation; it is not simply up to them.12 0 Even when the Rules are not
so direct, it would be odd to say the judge may not insist on cooperation.
And they are beginning to do so. Consider the clarion call in 2009 by a
Federal Judge in New York:
This Opinion should serve as a wake-up call to the Bar in this District
about the need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and
cooperation with opposing counsel in designing search terms or
"keywords" to be used to produce emails or other electronically stored
information ("ESI"). While this message has appeared in several cases
from outside this Circuit, it appears that the message has not reached
many members of our Bar.121
An abstract requirement of cooperation, on the other hand, seems
less suited to achieving practical results. There certainly has been some
discouraging recent history with efforts by rule to encourage improved
lawyer behavior. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were intended in
part to upgrade lawyer behavior, but were widely criticized for ushering
in a decade of corrosive finger-pointing.122 A cooperation requirement
118. Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Casefrom Filingto Disposition,69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 781-82 (1981).
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(f) (directing attorneys to discuss issues pertaining to preservation and
formulate a discovery plan).
121. William A. Gross Constr. Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
122. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the
Neutrality of ProceduralRules, 32 CONN. L. REv. 155, 157 (1999) (discussing the increase in Rule
11 litigation following the 1983 Amendment).
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might lead in a similar direction. But the unequaled latitude that
American procedure-particularly broad discovery-confers on
American lawyers surely makes cooperation on at least the details of
discovery something that lawyers ought to ensure. The real question is
not what they should do, but how to get them to do it.
IV. CONCLUSION

Forty years ago, Judge Frankel proposed that we "consider whether
the paramount commitment of counsel concerning matters of fact should
be to the discovery of truth rather than to the advancement of the client's
interest."l 2 3 He suggested further that this inquiry led to the question
"whether it would be an excessive price for the client to be stuck with the
truth rather than having counsel allied with him for concealment and
distortion."l 24 One might urge that the legal profession cooperate in
pursuing this goal. But so far as I know, Judge Frankel's cooperative
vision has found few enthusiastic takers in the bar. The era of Rambo
litigation followed instead.
The cooperation judges seek now is not so aggressive, but results
from their increasing role in providing adult supervision during the
pretrial process, particularly with regard to discovery. True, childish
behavior may actually be designed to conceal or distort-the sorts of
things Judge Frankel wished lawyers would abjure. But more often, I
suspect, it results from Rambo attitudes that are not so calculated.
Parents do not want their children to be little Rambos, and judges
increasingly resist that tendency among lawyers. Experienced litigators
seem increasingly to acknowledge that Rambo tactics are not the only
ones. Thus, in a large survey of lawyers in 2009, the Federal Judicial
Center found that 90% either agreed or strongly agreed with the
following statement: "Attorneys can cooperate in discovery while still
being zealous advocates for their clients." 2 5
The Sedona Cooperation Proclamation 26 has emerged in this
environment. Aspirational statements may sometimes seem toothless,
but they can produce results. Maybe Sedona has it right in producing
what is in large measure an aspirational endorsement of cooperation. At
123.
124.

Frankel, supra note 26, at 1055.
Id. at 1056.

EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL CASE125.
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 63, 104 (Fed. Jud. Center 2009).

126.

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

2013]1

COOPERATION AND LITIGATION

847

some point, it takes two to cooperate. But it is also true that one or the
other has to begin. Sometimes it takes an authority figure to break the
ice.
Self interest is the best lubricant, and it may be that good lawyers
will recognize that. More than twenty years ago, some lawyers began to
Thus, the San
appreciate the value of cooperation in discovery.
FranciscoRecorder featured a story entitled "Discovering Cooperation"
about a prominent defense lawyer's novel approach to securities fraud
suits.127 The example was a 1991 suit filed by the famed plaintiffs
lawyer William Lerach against a high-tech client of this lawyer.12 8
Under the lawyer's guidance, the company "agreed in the stipulated
order to produce relevant core documents and let plaintiffs lawyers
interview a selected group of directors, officers, and employees."' 29 The
company turned over twenty to twenty-five boxes of documents and
settled for an amount "in the lower range of payments" eighteen months
after the suit was filed.130 It spent about half as much in attorney fees as
it would have by defending in the conventional aggressive manner. The
article asked whether this example heralded "a new trend"-"[m]ore and
more securities cases seem to be moving toward informal and
My contemporaneous 1994
cooperative discovery techniques."' 3 '
handwritten note on the article was: "Will this ever work?"
At a general level, the experience of the last twenty years does not
suggest that since 1994 most cases have gone in this new direction. But
particularly in regard to the manifest challenges and burdens of ediscovery, more lawyers may be awakening to these possibilities.
Consider the recent recommendations of a nationally renowned ediscovery lawyer about how to move to the newest darling technique of
the area, predictive coding:
Whether a court smiles on a methodology may not be the best way to
conclude it's the better mousetrap. Keyword search and linear review
enjoy de facto court approval; yet both are deeply flawed and brutally
inefficient.
The imprimatur that matters most is "opponent approved." Motion
practice and false starts are expensive. The most cost-effective method
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Mark Boennighausen, Discovering Cooperation, S.F. RECORDER, March 30, 1994, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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is one the other side accepts without a fight, i.e., the least expensive
method that affords opponents superior confidence that responsive and
non-privileged material will be identified and produced.
Don't confuse that with an obligation to kowtow to the opposition
simply to avoid conflict. The scenario I'm describing is a true winwin . ...

132

These sorts of issues are likely to be a prime focus of good lawyers.
Not all lawyers are good lawyers. Not all lawyers will see the light
on issues like predictive coding. But rules to control the behavior of bad
lawyers may not be an improvement. The 2006 e-discovery amendments
to the Civil Rules, for example, largely rely on the parties (and the
lawyers) to design sensible protocols for specific cases rather than
prescribing specifics.1 33 Trying to provide those specifics was too
difficult.134 Specifics on cooperation would likely be more difficult yet
to prescribe. Judges who see uncooperative lawyers impeding progress
in cases before them have an array of formal (and many more informal)
ways to respond to their erring ways. They probably cannot change the
general culture of lawyering; if Rambo tactics are still frequent,
individual judges likely cannot end them. But they can deal fairly
effectively with them when they do see them. That is probably as much
as rules of cooperation can ever aspire to do.

132. Craig Ball, Imagining the Evidence, S.F. RECORDER, Aug. 13, 2012, at 15, available at
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202566842609&thepage=1.
133. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 321,
342-43 (2008) (making this point).
134. I am here recalling the drafting work on those amendments, which extended over many
years and explored a variety of possible specifics on topics that eventually were left to party
agreement.

